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Abstract—The communication scenario under consideration
in this paper corresponds to a multiuser channel with side
information and consists of a broadcast channel with two
legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper. Mainly, the results
obtained are as follows. First, an achievable rate region is
provided for the (general) case of discrete-input discrete-output
channels, generalizing existing results. Second, the obtained
theorem is used to derive achievable transmission rates for two
practical cases of Gaussian channels. It is shown that known
perturbations can enlarge the rate region of broadcast wiretap
channels with side information and having side information at
the decoder as well can increase the secrecy rate of channels
with side information. Third, we establish for the first time an
explicit connection between multiuser channels and observation
structures in dynamic games. In this respect, we show how to
exploit the proved achievability theorem (discrete case) to derive
a communication-compatible upper bound on the minmax level
of a player.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of secrecy in communication systems has been
widely studied since 1949 and the publication of [18] by
Shannon. He introduced a measure of secrecy for communica-
tion systems called equivocation. The secrecy capacity of the
general wiretap channel which consists of one transmitter, one
legitimate receiver, and one eavesdropper has been determined
in [21]. In [6], the authors extended this result assuming that
both the legitimate receiver (to which the confidential message
is intended) and the eavesdropper have to decode a common
message. Regarding broadcast channels, there are at least
three other relevant works. The authors of [19] investigate a
broadcast channel with side information or state at the encoder.
In this model, the transition probability is controlled by a
sequence of i.i.d. parameters whose realizations are known
non-causally and perfectly by the encoder. They conclude that
in the Gaussian case, there is no loss of rate of communication.
The authors of [2] provide an achievable rate region for the
broadcast channel with two legitimate receivers (each of them
having to decode a private and a confidential message) and an
eavesdropper; the corresponding region is shown to be tight
in the case of physically degraded broadcast channels. For the
case of reversely degraded parallel broadcast channels, one
eavesdropper, and an arbitrary number of legitimate receivers,
the authors of [13] determined the secrecy capacity for trans-
mitting a common message, and the secrecy sum-capacity for
transmitting independent messages.
As far as the present work is concerned, the most relevant
contribution is provided in [3]. Therein, the authors provide an
achievable rate of the discrete or general wiretap channel when
a side information is known non-causally to the transmitter
(in the sense of [10]). Their achievable secured rate is the
minimum between the secure rate of the wiretap channel [21]
and the rate of the channel with side information provided by
Gel’fand and Pinsker in [10]. The coding scheme in [3] is
proved to achieve at least one of these two rates and also
satisfy the security constraints R ≤ H(m|Z
n)
n
where m is
the source message, n is the codeword size, and Zn the
observation vector of the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 1. The broadcast wiretap channel with asymmetric side information.
The encoder C send the message m1 (resp. m2) to decoder D1 (resp. D2)
through the channel T by preventing the eavesdropper E to decode. X is the
channel input, S1 and Y1 (resp. S2 and Y2) are the side information and the
channel output available at the first (resp. second) decoder, Z is the channel
output for the eavesdropper.
We extend this result by considering the broadcast channel
with confidential messages represented in Fig. 1. With respect
to [3], two differences have to be noticed.
• A two-user broadcast channel is considered.
• Each legitimate receiver only knows a part of the side
information.
To be more precise, if (S1, S2) represents the pair of side
information, receiver or decoder Dk, with k ∈ {1, 2}, knows
only Sk. On the other hand, the eavesdropper E does not know
the side information at all.
The two main motivations for deriving an achievable rate
region for this multiuser channel are as follows. First of all,
the goal is to better understand the influence of the side
information on the performance limits of secure communica-
tions. The second strong motivation is more original since we
show that coding theorems are also useful for understanding
strategic interactions (games). Indeed, as mentioned in [14],
there has been, in recent years, a surge of interest for game
theory since it can be useful to analyze multiuser settings (the
interference channel is one of them [20], [9]). In those studies,
quite often, Shannon transmission rates are considered for
the player’s utilities and game-theoretic notions are applied.
One of the messages of the present work is that, conversely,
multiuser channels can be used to understand (dynamic) games
with arbitrary observation structures and utility functions. This
contributes to strengthen the links between Shannon theory
and game theory and gives more momentum to some works
in this direction such as [1] [16].
In the next section II, we introduce the channel model under
investigation and the main achievability result (Theorem 4).
We compare the derived result with previous works in Sec. III.
In Sec. IV, we prove theorem 4. Sec. V is devoted to exploiting
the derived theorem in the Gaussian case (achievability the-
orems follow in the Gaussian case provided long but simple
calculations are done, the latter are omitted here). We consider,
in Sec. VI, a direct application of our result to games. We
provide an upper bound on the min-max level in a four-player
long-run game with a given observation/monitoring structure
(called games with signals in the literature of game theory).
We conclude the paper by summarizing remarks and possible
extensions of this work (Sec. VII).
II. CHANNEL MODEL
In this paper, we denote X,S1, S2, Y1, Y2, Z the random
variables of the channel inputs x ∈ X , the side information
at the first s1 ∈ S1 and the second s2 ∈ S2 decoders,
the channel ouputs for the first y1 ∈ Y1 and the second
y2 ∈ Y2 decoders and the channel ouputs z ∈ Z for the
eavesdropper (see Fig 1). The corresponding sequences will be
written Zn = (Z(1), . . . , Z(n)), where superscripted letters
denote the vector. The messages m1 and m2 are uniformly
distributed among the sets M1 and M2 whose cardinalities
are denoted M1 = |M1| and M2 = |M2|. ∆(Y) denote the
set of probability distributions over the set Y , P⊗n ∈ ∆(Xn)
denote the n-times product of the probability P ∈ ∆(X ) and
co R denote the convex hull of a set R.
Consider a broadcast wiretap channel with asymmetric side
information, as a transition probability described in figure 1
T : X × S1 × S2 −→ ∆(Y1 × Y2 ×Z). (1)
The side information s1, s2 are drawn independently and iden-
tically distributed from the joint distribution Ps ∈ ∆(S1×S2).
The sequence of realizations sn1 , s
n
2 are non-causally known at
the encoder and at their respective decoders. The channel is
discrete and memoryless, i.e. the n-stage transition probability
is defined as follows:
T⊗n(yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn, sn1 , s
n
2 )
=
n∏
i=1
T (y1(i), y2(i), z(i)|x(i), s1(i), s2(i)). (2)
Definition 1: Define an (n,M1,M2)-code as a triplet of
functions as follows:
f :M1 ×M2 × S
n
1 × S
n
2 −→ X
n, (3)
g1 : Y
n
1 × S
n
1 −→M1, (4)
g2 : Y
n
2 × S
n
2 −→M2. (5)
(mˆ1, mˆ2) denote the random variable of the messages re-
constructed by the code. Define the error probability Pne
associated with each (n,M1,M2)-code as follows:
Pne = P((m1,m2) 6= (mˆ1, mˆ2)). (6)
The amount of information of a code is related to the
cardinality M1 and M2 of the sets of messages M1 andM2.
As in [17], this quantity is measured by the rate R = logM
n
of
the code. In the context of secure communication, the notion
of equivocation
H(m|Zn)
n
[18] is introduced as a measure of
the secrecy level guaranteed by a code. When this level is
greater than the rate of the code, it prevents the eavesdropper
from correctly decoding the transmitted information.
Definition 2: A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable
if for all ε > 0, there exists a (n,M1,M2)-code such that:
logM1
n
≥ R1 − ε, (7)
logM2
n
≥ R2 − ε, (8)
H(m1|Zn)
n
≥ R1 − ε, (9)
H(m2|Zn)
n
≥ R2 − ε, (10)
H(m1,m2|Zn)
n
≥ R1 + R2 − ε, (11)
Pne ≤ ε. (12)
Denote R the set of achievable rate pairs.
A. Main result
We provide an achievable rate region for the considered
broadcast wiretap channel with asymmetric side information.
Definition 3: Denote RI the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) such
that there exists a probability distribution P(u1, u2, x|s1, s2)
satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1, S1)−max(I(U1;Z), I(U1;S1, S2)),
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2, S2)−max(I(U2;Z), I(U2;S1, S2)),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1;Y1, S1) + I(U2;Y2, S2)− I(U1;U2)
−max(I(U1, U2;Z), I(U1, U2;S1, S2)). (13)
Remark that the probability P(u1, u2, x|s1, s2) induces a
general distribution Q that satisfies the Markov property
(U1, U2) − (X,S1, S2) − (Y1, Y2, Z). This probability Q is
defined for every (u1, u2, x, s1, s2, y1, y2, z), by the following
equation:
Q(u1, u2, x, s1, s2, y1, y2, z) =
Ps(s1, s2)× P(u1, u2, x|s1, s2)× T (y1, y2, z|x, s1, s2).
Theorem 4: Any rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ co RI is achievable
for the broadcast wiretap channel with asymmetric side infor-
mation.
Suppose that we need the channel input to be correlated with
a sequence of i.i.d. random variable Sn. The analysis leads to
consider the random variable S as a side information even if it
does not impact the transition probability. This remark applies,
more specifically, in a game theoretical framework (see Sec.
VI).
III. INTERPRETATION
The achievable rate regionRI we provide is a generalization
of the one in [3]. It consists in the intersection of two rate
regions. The first one is related to the side information as in
[19] and the second one is related to the eavesdropper as in
[2]. Note that if we remove the eavesdropper (Z = C) and
we consider that the side information is non-causally known
only at the encoder, our rate region boils down to the one of
[19] when the variable W is constant. If we remove the side
information (S1 = S2 = C), the rate region equals the one
described in [2]. Suppose we remove the receivers (D2) and
the side information (S1 = C) and in that case the rate region
boils down to the one of the article [3].
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We first prove the achievability of the rate pair (R1, R2) ∈
TI satisfying the above inequalities (13). Fix a distribution
Q(u1, u2, x, s1, s2, y1, y2, z) satisfying the channel transition
T (y1, y2, z|x, s1, s2), the distribution Ps(s1, s2) and the rates
inequalities (13). We will prove that the pair (R1, R2) ∈ TI is
achievable. Denote A∗nε (U1×U2|s
n
1 , s
n
2 ) the set of sequences
un1 , u
n
2 that are jointly typical with s
n
1 , s
n
2 . The properties of
the typical sequences can be founded in [5] and [7].
• Generation of the Code-book : Generate MY1 =
2nRY1 = 2n(I(U1;Y1,S1)−ε) sequences un1 from dis-
tribution QU1(u1)
⊗n. Distribute them at random into
M1 = 2
nR1 bins denoted i1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M1}, con-
taining each of them MU1 = 2
nRU1 sequences
un1 . Divide each bin i1 into MW1 = 2
nRW1 sub-
bins denoted j1 ∈ {1, . . . ,MW1} containing each of
them MZ1 = 2
nRZ1 sequences un1 with the follow-
ing parameters RU1 , RY1 , R1, RZ1 . Generate MY2 =
2nRY2 = 2n(I(U2;Y2,S2)−ε) sequences un2 from dis-
tribution QU2(u2)
⊗n. Distribute them at random into
M2 = 2
nR2 bins denoted i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,M2}, con-
taining each of them MU2 = 2
nRU2 sequences un2 .
Divide each bin i2 into MW2 = 2
nRW2 sub-bins de-
noted j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,MW2} containing each of them
MZ2 = 2
nRZ2 sequences un2 with the above param-
eters RU2 , RY2 , R2, RZ2 . For each tuple of sequences
(un1 , u
n
2 , s
n
1 , s
n
2 ) draw a sequence x
n from the distribution
Q(x|u1, u2, s1, s2)⊗n.
• Encoder obtains the message (i1, i2) ∈ M1×M2 and the
sequence of side information (sn1 , s
n
2 ). It finds a pair of
sequences un1 in the bin i1 and u
n
2 in the bin i2 such that
(un1 , u
n
2 ) ∈ A
∗n
ε (U1 × U2|s
n
1 , s
n
2 ). Send the sequence x
n
corresponding to the tuple of sequences (un1 , u
n
2 , s
n
1 , s
n
2 ).
RU1 > I(U1;S2, S1),
RU2 > I(U2;S1, S2),
RU1 + RU2 > I(U1;U2) + I(U1, U2;S1, S2),
RY1 = RU1 +R1 < I(U1;Y1, S1),
RY2 = RU2 +R1 < I(U2;Y2, S2),
RZ1 < I(U1;Z),
RZ2 < I(U2;Z),
RZ1 + RZ2 < I(U1;U2) + I(U1, U2;Z),
RU1 > RZ1 ,
RU2 > RZ2 .
• Decoder 1 receives the channel output yn1 and the se-
quence of side information sn1 . It finds a unique sequence
un1 such that u
n
1 ∈ A
∗n
ε (U1|y
n
1 , s
n
1 ) and it returns the bin
index i1 of the sequence u
n
1 .
• Decoder 2 receives the channel output yn2 and the se-
quence of side information sn2 . It finds a unique sequence
un2 such that u
n
2 ∈ A
∗n
ε (U2|y
n
2 , s
n
2 ) and it returns the bin
index i2 of the sequence u
n
2 .
The proof consists first to show that the error probability
can be upper bounded by ε > 0 as n goes to infinity.
Second, we check if the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper
is sufficiently high as n goes to infinity. We conclude that
the desired rate (R1, R2) pair belongs to the achievable rate
region that satisfies by the above inequalities (13).
Analysis of the error probability. As in the articles [10]
and [15], it is based on extensions of the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The properties of the typical sequences [7]. Let
the joint probability Q(x, y) ∈ ∆(X × Y ), then:
Q⊗n(xn ∈ An∗ε (X |y
n)|yn) ≥ 1− ε ∀yn ∈ An∗ε (Y ).
Lemma 2: The mutual covering lemma [8]. Suppose that
the family of sequences (u(i)n)i∈2nRI ∈ U
n is drawn i.i.d.
from Q⊗nU and (v(j)
n)j∈2nRJ is drawn i.i.d. from Q
⊗n
V . Then
for all ε > 0, there exists an n¯ ≥ 0 such that for all n ≥ n¯:
RI +RJ < I(U ;V ) =⇒
P(∪ i∈I,
j∈J
{(u(i)n, v(j)n) ∈ A∗nε (U × V )}) ≤ ε,
RI +RJ > I(U ;V ) =⇒
P(∩ i∈I,
j∈J
{(u(i)n, v(j)n) /∈ A∗nε (U × V )}) ≤ ε.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the encoder has to
transmit the messages (i1, i2). Denote Bi1 and Bi2 the bins of
sequences un1 and u
n
2 respectively. Let us define the following
error events:
• E1 = {(sn1 , s
n
2 ) /∈ A
∗n
ε (S1 × S2)} the two sequences of
side information are not jointly typical.
• E2 = {∀(un1 , u
n
2 ) ∈ Bi1 × Bi2 , (u
n
1 , u
n
2 ) /∈ A
∗n
ε (U1 ×
U2|sn1 , s
n
2 )} there is no pair of sequence (u
n
1 , u
n
2 ) in the
bins Bi1 and Bi2 that are jointly typical with (s
n
1 , s
n
2 ).
• E3 = {(xn, yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n) /∈ A∗nε (X × Y1 × Y2 ×
Z|un1 , u
n
2 , s
n
1 , s
n
2 )|(u
n
1 , u
n
2 , s
n
1 , s
n
2 ) ∈ A
∗n
ε (U1×U2×S1×
S2} the family (xn, yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n) of sequences is not jointly
typical with the jointly typical sequences (un1 , u
n
2 , s
n
1 , s
n
2 ).
• E4 = {∃u
′n
1 6= u
n
1 , (u
′n
1 , y
n
1 , s
n
1 )
n ∈ A∗nε (U1×Y1×S1)}
there is another vector u
′n
1 jointly typical with the channel
output yn1 and the side information s
n
1 .
• E5 = {∃u
′n
2 6= u
n
2 , (u
′n
2 , y
n
2 , s
n
2 ) ∈ A
∗n
ε (U2 × Y2 × S2)}
there is another vector u
′n
2 jointly typical with the channel
output yn2 and the side information s
n
2 .
Using an extension of covering lemma [8], we bound P(E2)
by ε as soon as, the following inequalities are satisfied.
RU1 > I(U1;S2, S1), (14)
RU2 > I(U2;S1, S2), (15)
RU1 +RU2 > I(U1;U2) + I(U1, U2;S1, S2). (16)
P(E4) and P(E5) are bounded by ε if:
RY1 = RU1 + R1 < I(U1;Y1, S1), (17)
RY2 = RU2 + R1 < I(U2;Y2, S2). (18)
To bound P(E1) and P(E3), we use classical properties of the
typical sequences [7]. Thus for all ε, there exists n such that,
Pne ≤ 5ε. (19)
We proved that the error probability is upper bounded by 5ε.
The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper.
Denote (m1,m2) the random variable of the pair of bins and
(w1, w2) the random variable of the pair of sub-bins. Let us
prove that
H(m1,m2|Zn)
n
≥ R1 + R2 − ε. We first introduce
the random variables w1, w2 and U
n
1 , U
n
2 in the expression of
H(m1,m2|Zn).
H(m1,m2|Z
n)
= H(m1,m2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(m1,m2, w1, w2, Z
n)
−H(w1, w2|m1,m2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(m1,m2, w1, w2, U
n
1 , U
n
2 , Z
n)
−H(Un1 , U
n
2 |m1,m2, w1, w2, Z
n)
−H(w1, w2|m1,m2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
(20)
= H(m1,m2, w1, w2|U
n
1 , U
n
2 , Z
n)
+H(Un1 , U
n
2 , Z
n)
−H(Un1 , U
n
2 |m1,m2, w1, w2, Z
n)
−H(w1, w2|m1,m2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(m1,m2, w1, w2|U
n
1 , U
n
2 , Z
n) (21)
+H(Un1 , U
n
2 |Z
n) (22)
−H(Un1 , U
n
2 |m1,m2, w1, w2, Z
n) (23)
−H(w1, w2|m1,m2, Z
n). (24)
We provide a lower bound for each of the four terms of the
above equation.
The first term (21) in the above equation is removed.
The second term (22) is lower bounded, using the chain rule
[5], by the following quantity:
H(Un1 , U
n
2 |Z
n)
= H(Un1 ) +H(U
n
2 )− I(U
n
1 ;U
n
2 )− I(U
n
1 , U
n
2 ;Z)
≥ I(Un1 ;Y
n
1 , S
n
1 ) + I(U
n
2 ;Y
n
2 , S
n
2 )
−I(Un1 ;U
n
2 )− I(U
n
1 , U
n
2 ;Z)
≥ n[I(U1;Y1, S1) + I(U2;Y2, S2)
−I(U1;U2)− I(U1, U2;Z)].
The third term (23) is lower bounded by −2ε − n2ε log |Z|
using Fano’s inequality [5] and the following system of
conditions:
RZ1 < I(U1;Z), (25)
RZ2 < I(U2;Z), (26)
RZ1 +RZ2 < I(U1;U2) + I(U1, U2;Z). (27)
Denote Bm1 the bin with index m1 and Bw1 the sub-bin with
index w1. Let the following events:
E6 = {∀(u1, u2) ∈ (Bm1 ×Bm2) ∩ (Bw1 ×Bw2),
(un1 , u
n
2 , z
n) /∈ A∗nε (U1 × U2 × Z)},
E7 = {∃(u1, u2)
′ 6= (u1, u2)
∈ (Bm1 ×Bm2) ∩ (Bw1 ×Bw2),
s.t.(u′1, u
′
2, z) ∈ A
∗n
ε (U1 × U2 × Z)}.
Consider a typical decoding function of the eavesdropper
knowing the pairs of bin indexes (m1,m2) and sub-bin index
(w1, w2),
g : Zn −→ Un1 × U
n
2 . (28)
To the received sequence zn, it associates the pair (un1 , u
n
2 ) if
it belong to the bins (m1,m2), the sub-bins (w1, w2) and is
jointly typical with zn. Define the error probability of such a
decoding function
Pæ = P((U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) 6= g(Z
n) s.t. (Un1 , U
n
2 ) ∈
(Bm1 ×Bm2) ∩ (Bw1 ×Bw2)) (29)
≤ P(E6) + P(E7) ≤ 2ε, (30)
where P(E6) ≤ ε comes from properties of the typical
sequences [7] and P(E7) ≤ ε comes from the above system
of equations (25)-(27). Using Fano’s inequality [5] we have:
H(Un1 , U
n
2 |m1,m2, w1, w2, Z
n)
≤ H(Pæ) + nPæ(log |Z| − ε)
≤ 2ε+ n2ε log |Z|.
The fourth term (24) is lower bounded by the following
quantity: −n(max[I(U1, U2;S1, S2)− I(U1, U2;Z), 0] + 4ε).
From the condition (16) and the definition of the sub-bins we
have:
RU1 +RU2 ≥ max[I(U1, U2;S1, S2)
+I(U1;U2), RZ1 + RZ2 ]. (31)
Suppose that the two following conditions are satisfied:
RU1 +RU2 ≤ max[I(U1, U2;S1, S2)
+I(U1;U2), RZ1 +RZ2 ] + 2ε, (32)
RZ1 +RZ2 ≥ I(U1;U2) + I(U1, U2;Z)− 2ε. (33)
We now prove the following inequalities:
H(w1, w2|m1,m2, Z
n)
≤ log(|W1| × |W2|)
= n(RU1 +RU2 −RZ1 −RZ2)
≤ n(max[I(U1;U2) + I(U1, U2;S1, S2),
I(U1;U2)I(U1, U2;Z)] + 2ε
−I(U1;U2)− I(U1, U2;Z) + 2ε)
≤ n(max[I(U1, U2;S1, S2)− I(U1, U2;Z), 0] + 4ε).
Combining the four above terms, we obtain the lower bound
R1 +R2 − ε¯ over the equivocation rate.
H(m1,m2|Z
n)
≥ n(I(U1;Y1, S1) + I(U2;Y2, S2)
−I(U1;U2)− I(U1, U2;Z))− 2ε− n2ε log |Z|
−n(max(I(U1, U2;S1, S2)− I(U1, U2;Z), 0) + 4ε)
≥ n(I(U1;Y1, S1) + I(U2;Y2, S2)
−I(U1;U2)−max(I(U1, U2;S1, S2), I(U1, U2;Z)))
−2ε− nε(2 log |Z|+ 4)
≥ n(R1 +R2)− 2ε− nε(2 log |Z|+ 4).
⇐⇒
I(m1,m2;Z
n)
n
≤ ε¯.
With ε¯ = ε(2/n+ 2 log |Z| + 4). The same arguments apply
to prove that:
H(m1|Zn)
n
≥ R1 − ε¯, (34)
H(m2|Zn)
n
≥ R2 − ε¯. (35)
The transmission rates are determined by the binning
scheme:
R1 = RY1 −RU1 ,
R2 = RY2 −RU2 ,
R1 +R2 = (RY1 +RY2)−RU1 −RU2 .
We have proven that our coding scheme achieves every rate
pair of the following rate region RI .
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1, S1)−max[I(U1;Z), I(U1;S1, S2)],
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2, S2)−max[I(U2;Z), I(U2;S1, S2)],
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1;Y1, S1) + I(U2;Y2, S2)− I(U1;U2)
− max[I(U1, U2;Z); I(U1, U2;S1, S2)].
A classical time-sharing argument in the coding scheme
implies that the convex hull co RI of the rate region is
achievable.
V. THE CASE OF GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
In this section, we want to show theorem 4 can be exploited
for Gaussian communication channels. At least two interesting
results are emphasized. For the first model under consideration
(Fig. 2), it is shown that the presence of known perturbations
(namely S1 and S2) can enhance the secrecy rates. In fact, if
those perturbations are sufficiently strong, it is even possible
to obtain the same rate region as if the eavesdropper were
not present. For the second model (Fig. 4), it is shown that
knowing the side information can lead to a larger secrecy rate,
which is usually not the case in channels with states but with
no eavesdropper.
A. Increasing the influence of known perturbations enhances
the rate region
E
D1
D2
W
(m1,m2) X
Y1
Y2
Z
S1
S2
mˆ1
mˆ2
W1
W3
W2
Fig. 2. The Gaussian broadcast wiretap channel with asymmetric side
information.
The Gaussian broadcast wiretap channel with asymmetric
side information we consider is described by the following
equations:
Y1 = X + S2 +W1 (36)
Y2 = X + S1 +W2 (37)
Z = X + S1 + S2 +W3 (38)
The random variables W1, W2, W3, S1, S2 are Gaussian with
mean 0 and variance N1, N2, N3, Q1, Q2. The channel states
S1 and S2 are correlated following the parameter ρ =
E[S1S2]√
Q1Q2
.
The channel input X must satisfy the constraint:
E[X2] ≤ P (39)
Without loss of generality, we suppose that N1 ≥ N2. The
channel of the first receiver is physically degradable version of
the second one. Let α1 ∈ R, α2 ∈ R, β ∈ [0, 1] and β¯ = 1−β.
Decompose X = X1 + X2 into two independent Gaussian
random variables X1 and X2 with mean 0 and variance βP
and β¯P . Define the following auxiliary random variables:
U1 = X1 + α1S2 ∼ N (0, βP + α
2
1Q2)
U2 = X2 + α2(S1 +X1) ∼ N (0, β¯P + α
2
2(Q1 + βP ))
Numerical simulations (Fig. 3) illustrate the achievable rate
region comparing to the previous results in [19], [2] and [3].
In Fig. 3, we compare the achievable rate region for different
values Q1 and Q2 of the variance of the side information
S1, S2 and for the correlation parameter ρ = 0. When the
variance of the side information is low (Q1 = Q2 = 0.1), the
rate region (in blue) is close to the one of [2]. Whereas for
high variance of the side information (Q1 = Q2 = 20), the
rate region (in yellow) is close to the capacity region for the
broadcast channel of [19]. High variances Q1 and Q2 for the
side information are sufficient to compensate for the presence
of an eavesdropper in the network.
Fig. 3. Rate region for the correlation parameter ρ = 0 and different values
of Q1 and Q2.
B. Having the side information at the decoder as well allows
to enlarge the secrecy rate
Often, when already available at the encoder, the knowledge
of the side information at the decoder does not increase the
transmission rate [4][19]. However, this is not true when
considering channels with security constraints. We provide a
special case of our channel model for which the knowledge
of the side information at the decoder strictly increases the
achievable rate.
C
D1
E
m X
Y1
Z
S1
mˆ
W1
W3
Fig. 4. The Gaussian wiretap channel with side information non-causally
known at both the encoder and the decoder.
The Gaussian broadcast wiretap channel with side informa-
tion at the decoder is described by the following equations:
Y1 = X + S1 +W1, (40)
Z = X + S1 +W3. (41)
This channel is a special case of the model we consider here
above when we remove the decoder D2 and we fix the second
side information constant S2 = ∅. The side information S1 is
non-causally known at the decoder. The random variablesW1,
W3, S1, are gaussian with mean 0 and variance N1, N3, Q1.
The channel input X must satisfies the constraint:
E[X2] ≤ P (42)
Theorem 5: The capacity of the channel with state is
achievable.
C = I(U1;Y1|S1).
The proof consists in replacing the random variable U1 with
a parameter α1 ≫ 1 in the first equation of (13).
VI. MIN-MAX LEVEL FOR A LONG-RUN GAME WITH
SIGNALS
The above-referenced channel is now used to model the
transmission of strategic information in a long-run game with
signals that is, a game where a given player has a certain ob-
servation of the actions played by the others [1]. Therefore, in
dynamic games with imperfect monitoring/observation, play-
ers observe the actions taken by other players through channels
also called “signalling structure”. An important challenge is to
characterize the set of equilibrium utilities for a long-run game
with imperfect monitoring; even in the case of repeated games,
the problem of finding this set is still open [16]. This problem
is closely related to the characterization of achievable rate
regions for a class of channel models containing the one we
investigate in this paper. Coding/decoding schemes designed
for channels with security constraints can allow a group of
players to correlate their sequence of plays keeping it secret
from another group of players. Our main contribution is to
point out a general methodology which can be used in many
other scenarios and provide, for a specific example an upper
bound on min-max levels. The example chosen is a four-player
repeated game with signals, directly establishing a link with
the multiuser channel studied in Sec. II.
A. A repeated game with signals
A stage game is defined by a set of players K, each of them
having a set of actions Ak and a stage-utility function uk. In
a long run game, a strategy τk = (τ
t
k)1≤t of player k ∈ K is a
sequence of functions from the sequences of signals S
×(t−1)
k
into the mixed actions ∆(Ak):
τ tk : S
×(t−1)
k −→ ∆(Ak) (43)
A profile of strategies τ = (τk)i∈K induces a probability
distribution Pτ ∈ ∆(A∞) over the sequences of actions
(at)t≥1. The utility of the n-stage game is related to the above
probability Pτ .
γnk (τ) = Eτ
1
n
n∑
t=1
uk(a
t
1, . . . , a
t
K) (44)
The reader is referred to the paper of Renault and Tomala
[16] for more details about the model of repeated games with
signals.
B. The min-max levels as “punishment levels”
The min-max level, also called “the punishment level”, of a
player measures the worst utility level this player can be forced
by the others in a long-run game. The formal problem of the
min-max levels is in the articles of Gossner and Tomala [11],
[12]. They provide a characterization of the min-max using
entropy methods. Denote τ−k the vector of strategy of all the
players ℓ 6= k ∈ K except k ∈ K.
Definition 6: The uniform min-max v∞k for player k ∈ K
is defined as follows:
• The players ℓ 6= k ∈ K guarantee v∞k ∈ R if:
∀ε > 0, ∃τ−k, ∃N ∈ N, ∀τk, ∀n ≥ N (45)
γnk (τk, τ−k) ≤ v
∞
k + ε (46)
• The player k ∈ K defends v∞k ∈ R if:
∀ε > 0, ∀τ−k, ∃τk, ∃N ∈ N, ∀n ≥ N (47)
γnk (τk, τ−k) ≥ v
∞
k − ε (48)
• The uniform min-max of player k ∈ K, if it exists, is
v∞k ∈ R such that players ℓ 6= k ∈ K guarantee v
∞
k ∈ R
and player k ∈ K defends v∞k ∈ R.
C. Upper bound on min-max levels
We denote A123 = A1 × A2 × A3 the product of actions
set and X123 =
∏
k=1,2,3∆(Ak) the product of independent
probabilities over the player’s actions.
Definition 7: Define Q1 ⊂ ∆(A1 × A2 × A3) the set
of achievable empirical distributions, where player P1 is the
encoder, such that for all Q1 ∈ Q1 there exists a distribution,
Q˜1 ∈ ∆(U2 × U3 ×A1 × . . .A3 × S1 × . . .S4)
satisfying the two following conditions:
• the conditions on the marginals:∑
u,s
Q˜1(u, a, s) = Q1(a)
Q˜1(s|u, a) = T (s2, s3, s4|a1, a2, a3)
• the information theoretical conditions:
H(A2) ≤ I(U2;S2, A2)
− max(I(U2;S4), I(U2;A2, A3))
H(A3) ≤ I(U3;S3, A3)
− max(I(U3;S4), I(U3;A2, A3))
H(A2) + H(A3) ≤ I(U2;S2, A2)
+ I(U3;S3, A3)− I(U2;U3)
− max(I(U2, U3;S4), I(U2, U3;A2, A3))
Define in a similar way Q2 (resp. Q3), when player P2 (resp.
player P3) is an encoder in the above channel model. Let Q123
denote the convex hull of the union of achievable distributions
when one of the players is an encoder:
Q123 = co [Q1 ∪Q2 ∪Q3 ∪X123] ⊂ ∆(A123)
Theorem 8: Suppose that the channel transition T does not
depend on the actions of the fourth player:
T (s1, s2, s3, s4|a1, a2, a3, a4) = T (s1, s2, s3, s4|a1, a2, a3),
∀ak, sk, k ∈ K
The uniform min-max level v∞4 of player P4 for the repeated
game with signals is upper bounded by the following quantity:
v∞4 ≤ minQ∈Q123
max
a4∈A4
EQu4(a1, a2, a3, a4) = ν
D. Sketch of the proof of Theorem 8
We have proven that the coding scheme described in the
previous section is optimal for the players in order to guarantee
the value ν ∈ R. Face to the above strategy for players P1,
P2 and P3, every strategy τ4 for player P4, leads to a long-
run expected utility below ν ∈ R. Suppose that the optimal
distribution Q∗ ∈ ∆(A123) is a convex combination:
Q∗ =
J∑
j=1
αjQ
∗
j ∈ Q123 (49)
The play of players P1, P2 and P3 is divided into J blocks
of stages of length Nj where the players implement Q
∗
j . Each
block Nj of stages is divided into I + 1 sub-block N ij where
the encoding player communicate to the others, the sequence
of actions they will play in the next sub-block. The recursive
coding process is described in Fig. VI-D.
For each sub-block i ∈ I , the coding scheme consists
of a concatenation of the Shannon’s source coding scheme
[5] and the channel coding scheme investigated here above.
The joint source coding scheme is described in Fig. VI-D
where Aik denotes the sequence of actions of player Pk during
the sub-block of stages N ij . The entropy constraints (49) in
an3
an2
an1
Nj Nj+1
N0j N
1
j N
2
j
Fig. 5. During the sub-block N0
j
player P1 wants players P2 and P3 to
play certain actions during the sub-block of stages N1j . It can be noticed
that the knowledge of the sequence of future realizations of the channel state
(non-causal side information) at the encoder is therefore fully justified from
a game theoretical point of view.
the definition of Q123 insure that the sequence of actions of
players can be sent over the channel and recovered with an
arbitrary small error probability.
P1
P2
P3
P4
(m1, m2)(A
i+1
2 , A
i+1
3 )
Ai1
T
Si2
Si3
Si4
Ai2
Ai3
mˆ1
mˆ2
Aˆ
i+1
2
Aˆ
i+1
3
P1
P2
P3
Fig. 6. The joint source channel coding scheme for transmitting during the
sub-block of stages N ij the actions of the sub-block of stages N
i+1
j
.
Our coding scheme guarantees that the expectation of the
empirical distribution of plays E[Q¯] converges to the optimal
distributionQ∗. Second, the coding scheme guarantees that the
distribution over the signals sn4 of player P4 prevents her to
guess the future sequence of correlated actions of the players
P1, P2 and P3.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates a generalization of the wiretap
channel with two receivers and one eavesdropper where the
channel transition depends on states known non-causally and
perfectly at the encoder and partially known at both receivers.
The main theorem of the paper provides an achievable rate
region. Applying the theorem to the Gaussian case allows one
to make several interesting observations. In particular, two
scenarios have been studied. In the first scenario, we have
shown that, contrarily to [4] and related works, having side
information at the decoder in addition to having it at the
encoder is useful when security constraints come into play.
Whereas this result has been proved for the Gaussian case,
further works should be necessary to study the discrete case
(e.g., by introducing more auxiliary variables to fully exploit
the knowledge of the side information at the encoder). In
the second scenario, it is shown that the presence of known
perturbations (namely S1 and S2) can enhance the secrecy
rates. In fact, if those perturbations are sufficiently strong,
it is even possible to obtain the same rate region as if the
eavesdropper were not present. Another type of interesting
result is that we show how multiuser Shannon theory can be
exploited for general games, opening a general methodology to
derive communication-compatible game-theoretic such as min-
max levels, feasible joint distributions or correlated strategies,
etc. One the key observations made in this paper is that source-
channel theorems might play an increasing role in games
where inter-player communications is allowed.
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